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1 Introduction
We consider a public project implementation through a unit-by-unit contribution mechanism. We
investigate in detail the implementation of a project that is nonharmful for all agents as well as a
project that is harmful for some agents. We examine under what conditions the project is undertaken
Pareto-eﬃciently through the unit-by-unit contribution mechanism.
The unit-by-unit contribution mechanism is introduced to provide a discrete pure public good in
integer units. As in a standard case of public-good provision in nonnegative real numbers, voluntary
public-good provision in nonnegative integer units suﬀers from the free-rider problem, so that the
public good is not supplied Pareto eﬃciently.1 One of the solutions to this problem is to construct
public-good mechanisms. To solve the free-rider problem of an integer-unit public good, Bagnoli
and Lipman (1989) introduce a unit-by-unit contribution mechanism. Later, Branzei et al. (2005)
introduced another mechanism, which is a bit diﬀerent from, but essentially the same as, Bagnoli and
Lipman’s (1989) mechanism2 and applied it to a public-good problem that is diﬀerent from the Bagnoli
and Lipman (1989) problem. Their mechanisms to solve the problem are based on the idea that the
level of public-good provision is decided through a “unit-by-unit” process. In their mechanisms, agents
are asked to make marginal contributions to every one-unit increase in the public good. Based on
the contributions, starting from the first unit of the good, the quantity increases by one unit as long
as the sum of the marginal contributions to a one-unit increase covers its marginal cost. Bagnoli and
Lipman (1989) and Branzei et al. (2005) show that the unit-by-unit contribution mechanism has a
Nash equilibrium at which the public good is provided Pareto-eﬃciently. Moreover, they show that
although this mechanism may have other Nash equilibria at which the public good is provided Pareto-
ineﬃciently, some refinements of Nash equilibria single out the Nash equilibria with eﬃcient provision
of the public good. In this sense, the mechanism solves the free-rider problem of the provision of an
integer-unit public good.3
We could say that this mechanism is based on a “simple” rule: whether the public good increases by
one unit depends only on the relationship between the marginal contributions to and the marginal cost
of this increase and the payment from each agent is the sum of her announced marginal contributions to
each unit. Moreover, we could say that this mechanism is “suitable” in the provision of an integer-unit
public good because it utilizes a discrete structure of an integer-unit public good. Because of this
simplicity and suitability, it seems to have some applicability to the implementation of public projects
in the real world. Hence, it would be important to know how this mechanism works in the provision of
various public projects.
1 For the voluntary provision of an integer-unit public good, see, for example, Bagnoli and Lipman (1989, p. 591, last
paragraph), Gradstein and Nitzan (1990), and Shinohara (2009).
2 See a detailed explanation of this point in Section 2.
3 To be precise, Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) use a refinement of trembling-perfect Nash equilibria and Branzei et al. (2005)
use a strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann, 1959). Their refinement concepts are completely diﬀerent. They prove that
payoﬀs attained at those refined Nash equilibria coincide with the core of a cooperative game. We also use several
refinements of Nash equilibria based on coalition formation, including the strong Nash equilibrium.
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However, this mechanism has been tested under limited situations in the literature. Bagnoli and
Lipman (1989) and Branzei et al. (2005) assume that agents have a quasi-linear utility function with
respect to a private good and benefits from a public good are measured in terms of the private good.
Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) assume that agents’ benefit functions from the public good are increasing
and strictly concave in its level, which are seemingly standard conditions for public good provision. On
the other hand, Branzei et al. (2005) assume that each agent has a threshold level of the public good and
he receives a positive constant benefit if and only if the public good is provided at the threshold level
or higher. How this mechanism works has not been clarified in the implementation of public projects
that cannot be captured by those benefit structures.
Moreover, when it comes to public projects in the real world, they are sometimes harmful in the
sense that raising the level of a public project may decrease someone’s benefits. For example, consider
the construction of a high-speed railway (HSR) network such as the Shinkansen bullet-train projects
in Japan. This project connects Tokyo (the capital city) to the peripheral cities with HSR networks,
which have been extended sequentially.4 It is said that this extension has two sides: it may stimulate
the local economies since tourism is promoted and some companies in the capital city establish branch
oﬃces in the local cities. On the other hand, it may create disadvantages such as outflow of population
from local cities. In reality, these positive and negative sides would determine benefits of peripheral
cities. Some empirical studies show that extension of the HSR network does not necessarily benefit
peripheral cities.5 If we interpret this extension as an increase in the project level, some agents might
lose their benefits from the project by the increase. This shows public project eﬀects that cannot be
captured by the benefit structures of earlier studies. When examining the applicability of the unit-by-
unit contribution mechanism to the implementation of real-world public projects, we need to consider
the case in which a public project is harmful for some agents. However, this has not been considered
in the literature.
In order to examine applicability of the unit-by-unit contribution mechanism, we need to introduce
a framework that can capture as many public projects as possible. We introduce two types of public
projects—one is “nonharmful” for all agents and the other is sometimes “harmful” for some agents—and
examine the implementation of each public project through the unit-by-unit contribution mechanism.
Our aim is to clarify to what extent this mechanism achieves eﬃcient public project implementation in
each case .
First, a project is defined to be nonharmful for all agents if their benefit functions from the project
are weakly increasing in the level of the project. The weakly increasing benefit functions are worth
analyzing because they are a generalization of the benefit functions of Bagnoli and Lipman (1989)
and Branzei et al. (2005). We show that the unit-by-unit contribution mechanism always has a Nash
equilibrium at which the nonharmful public project is undertaken Pareto-eﬃciently, although it may
have a Nash equilibrium at which the project is done ineﬃciently. We further prove that with and
4 For instance, Tokyo and Nagano city (a city about 220 km away from Tokyo) were connected by the HSR network in
1997. This network was extended to Kanazawa city (a city about 450 km away from Tokyo) in 2015.
5 For a Japanese case, see, for example, Sasaki et al. (1997). Similar eﬀects have been observed from the extension of HSR
networks in European countries. See, for example, Ureña et al. (2009).
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without monetary transfers, the set of Nash equilibria with eﬃcient project implementation coincides
with the set of strong Nash equilibria and the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria (Bernheim et al.,
1987) (Theorem 1). These results show that although multiple public project levels may be supported at
the Nash equilibria, only Nash equilibria with eﬃcient project implementation are supported by various
Nash equilibrium refinements that are robust to coalition deviations. Theorem 1 supplements the results
of earlier studies as follows: First, in the earlier studies, the weakly increasing property of the benefit
functions is a key factor in the mechanism of eﬃcient public good provision at a Nash equilibrium.
Second, the Nash equilibria for eﬃcient projects are much more robust to coalition deviations than are
shown by Branzei et al. (2005) because they test only a strong Nash equilibrium without transfers.
Second, a project is considered harmful for some agents if their benefit functions from the project
are not weakly increasing in its level. We additionally impose weak concavity on the benefit functions
of all agents for tractability. We show that the unit-by-unit contribution mechanism does not always
work well in the implementation of a harmful project. Unlike in nonharmful projects, this mechanism
does not always have a Nash equilibrium with eﬃcient public project implementation. Moreover, this
mechanism may have a Nash equilibrium at which the project is undertaken over the eﬃcient level. We
establish necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a Nash equilibrium with implementation of the project
at or over the eﬃcient level (see Propositions 1 and 2). As for nonharmful projects, these conditions lead
to the possibility of multiple Nash equilibria with both eﬃcient and ineﬃcient implementation of the
public project. Then, we examine the strong Nash equilibrium and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium to
clarify the level of project implementation—the eﬃcient level or the over-implementation level—that
is robust to coalition deviations. We observe that these refined Nash equilibria do not always select
Nash equilibrium with eﬃcient project implementation. First, we find that the mechanism may not
have strong Nash equilibria with or without transfers. Second, although coalition-proof Nash equilibria
with and without transfers do exist, they do not always single out Nash equilibria with eﬃcient project
implementation. Coalition-proof Nash equilibria single out Nash equilibria with eﬃcient project
implementation if and only if there is a Nash equilibrium with eﬃcient project implementation, and
no other Nash equilibria with over-implementation (Theorem 3). Finally, we introduce a reasonably
large class of modified unit-by-unit contribution mechanism and investigate whether this modified
mechanism achieves the eﬃcient undertaking of harmful public projects. We show that no mechanism
in this class implements the eﬃciency project in Nash equilibria (Proposition 5).
In conclusion, when the project is nonharmful for all agents, the unit-by-unit contribution mechanism
works well since it only achieves an eﬃcient project at various refined Nash equilibria. On the other
hand, when the project is harmful for some agents, the mechanism does not necessarily work since it
may not have a Nash equilibrium with an eﬃcient project. Furthermore, even if it has such a Nash
equilibrium, none of the refined Nash equilibrium based on coalition deviations considered in this
paper singles it out. Thus, whether the unit-by-unit contribution mechanism works depends on the
property of the project. The merit of the unit-by-unit contribution mechanism reported in the literature
is extensible to the implementation of a nonharmful project, but only partially extensible to that of a
harmful public project. If we aim to achieve eﬃcient project implementation under general benefit
structures at various refined Nash equilibria based on coalition deviations, we need to consider another
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class of modified unit-by-unit contribution mechanisms or construct new mechanisms.
Finally, we mention some related studies. Our conditions on benefit functions from a public project
could be compared with several classes of benefit functions of Laussel and Le Breton (2001). In our
model, if all agents have weakly increasing benefit functions, then the comonotonicity condition of
Laussel and Le Breton (2001) holds. Otherwise, it does not. The two-sided property of Laussel and Le
Breton (2001), another condition of benefit structures, does not hold in our model.6 Thus, our benefit
function conditions cannot be fully captured by the Laussel and Le Breton (2001) classes of benefit
functions. In this sense, we analyze a new class of benefit functions. However, note that Laussel and Le
Breton (2001) work on the common agency game, which is diﬀerent from our unit-by-unit contribution
game because ours does not have a profit-maximizing common agency to implement public projects.
It seems less significant to compare their results with ours.
To the best of my knowledge, apart from Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) and Branzei et al. (2005),
only Yu (2005) proposes a mechanism, which is completely diﬀerent from the unit-by-unit contribution
mechanism, for provision of an integer-unit pure public good. Her two-stage mechanism implements
any one of the allocations in the core in an undominated subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. A
voluntary participation problem, pointed out by Saijo and Yamato (1999), can be captured as another
free-rider problem of public good provision related to the participation decision in a public good
mechanism. Nishimura and Shinohara (2013) propose a multi-stage mechanism, called a unit-by-unit
participation mechanism, and show that the idea of a unit-by-unit process can mitigate this problem.
Although the unit-by-unit participation mechanism and our mechanism are totally diﬀerent, Nishimura
and Shinohara (2013) do not explore the extensibility of the merit of the unit-by-unit participation
mechanism to the implementation of harmful or nonharmful projects. Shinohara (2014) investigates a
voluntary participation problem in which agents have the same benefit functions as those of Branzei et
al. (2005). Shinohara (2014) does not study this extensibility, either.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model and equilibrium concepts. Section
3 presents the results for nonharmful projects. Section 4 provides the results for harmful projects.
Section 5 concludes the study. The proofs of the propositions in Sections 3 and 4 are collated in the
appendices.
2 The model
Consider an economy in which agents undertake a public project through contribution of a private good
(money). The level of the public project is assumed to take a nonnegative integer. LetY = f0; 1; : : : ; yg
be the set of project levels, where y is an integer greater than or equal to one, and the finite upper bound
of the public project level. Let c : Y ! R+ be a cost function of the project such that c(0) = 0. For all
y; y0 2 Y such that y  y0, let c(y; y0)  c(y)   c(y0) be the additional (marginal) cost from y0 to y
6 For the definitions of comonotonicity and two-sidedness, see Laussel and Le Breton (2001).
5
units. We assume that c is an increasing and weakly convex function in Y: that is,
c(y + 1; y) > 0 for all y 2 Y
and c(y + 1; y)  c(y0 + 1; y0) for all y; y0 2 Y such that y > y0. (1)
Let N = f1; : : : ; ng be the set of agents such that n is a finite integer and n  1. Each agent i 2 N has
a quasi-linear utility function Ui : Y  R+ ! R such that Ui (y; ti) = ui (y)   ti , in which ui : Y ! R
is agent i’s benefit function from the project with ui (0) = 0 and ti is i’s private-good contribution to
the project. For all y; y0 2 Y such that y  y0, let ui (y; y0)  ui (y)   ui (y0) be agent i’s additional
(marginal) benefit from the increase from y0 to y units.
We assume that the project has a “public-good nature”; that is, every agent benefits from the same
project level, irrespective of his contribution. However, we do not always assume that the project is
a public “good.” We allow the case in which a higher project level may harm some agents, while it
benefits others. In the subsequent sections, we impose additional conditions on ui , which determine
the project character. Note that in our model, agents who benefit from a higher project level, if any,
want to free-ride others’ contribution. That is, the free-rider problem does matter.
We identify an economy by a list [N; (ui)i2N; c]. For each economy, the existence of the Pareto-
eﬃcient level for a project is trivial since Y is a finite set. For analytical simplicity, we assume that
y 2 Y is a unique eﬃcient project level, where y is positive; that is, fyg = argmaxy2Y Pi2N ui (y) 
c(y).7 We also assume that for all coalitions D  N , argmaxy2Y Pj2D u j (y)   c(y) is a singleton.
For all D  N , let Y (D) 2 Y be a stand-alone level of the project for D such that fY (D)g =
argmaxy2Y
P
j2D u j (y)   c(y). We do not assume that Y (D) is positive for all D ( N . Let
Ymax  maxDN Y (D). The assumption of a unique stand-alone level for each coalition is used only
in Section 4.
We immediately obtain Lemma 1 from the uniqueness of the eﬃcient level y.
Lemma 1 For all y 2 Y, Pj2N u j (y; y) > c(y; y) if y > y and Pj2N u j (y; y) < c(y; y) if
y < y.
Proof. By the eﬃciency and the uniqueness of y, Pj2N u j (y)   c(y) > Pj2N u j (y)   c(y) for all
y 2 Ynfyg, which implies the conditions in the statement. 
We focus on the undertaking of a public project through a unit-by-unit contribution mechanism,
which is the same as the mechanism of Branzei et al. (2005). In this mechanism, each agent i 2 N
simultaneously chooses a vector of marginal contributions to each one-unit increase of the project.
Let i  (yi )y2Ynf0g 2 Ry+ be a typical vector of marginal contributions chosen by agent i, in which

y
i 2 R+ is a marginal contribution from i to the marginal production from y   1 to y units. The
project level is determined as follows: y 2 Ynf0g units of the project are undertaken at  = (i)i2N
if and only if (i) for all units of y^, which is less than or equal to y, the sum of contributions to the y^-th
unit of the project,
P
i2N 
y^
i , covers the marginal cost of that unit, c( y^; y^   1), and (ii) the sum of
7 The subsequent analysis is applicable to the trivial case of y = 0.
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contributions to y + 1-th unit,
P
i2N 
y+1
i , falls short of the marginal cost c(y + 1; y). If the marginal
cost of the first unit is not covered by the sum of contributions to that unit, then the project level is zero.
Formally, for each  = (i)i2N 2 Rny+ , let y() be the public project level at  such that
y()  max
8><>:y 2 Y
 X
i2N

y^
i  c( y^; y^   1) for all y^ 2 Y such that y^  y:
9>=>; ; (2)
where we define 0i  0 for all i 2 N and c(0)   c(0   1)  0 for consistency. For all  2 Rny+ , each
agent i pays
P
y2Ynf0g 
y
i . In this mechanism, the marginal contribution to some unit is never refunded
even though the project is not undertaken at that unit. However, as we will see later, the contribution is
never wasted at every Nash equilibrium.
The mechanism accompanied with (Ui)i2N constitutes a strategic-form game   = [N; (Si;Vi)i2N ],
in which Si  Ry+ is the set of strategies for i 2 N and Vi :
Q
j2N Sj ! R is agent i’s payoﬀ
function, depending on strategies such that  2 Qj2N Sj 7 ! Vi ()  Ui (y();Py2Ynf0g yi ) 2 R.
Hereafter, we call   a unit-by-unit contribution game. The unit-by-unit contribution game is a complete
information game.
Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) introduce a multi-stage unit-by-unit contribution mechanism. It starts
with the decision on whether to provide the first unit of the project. In the first stage, the agents
contribute to the first unit of the project. If the sum of contributions to the first unit covers the marginal
cost for that unit, the first unit is provided, and the agents go to the second stage. Otherwise, the first
unit is not provided, and the mechanism ends. If the agents go to the second stage, it is decided in the
same way whether to provide a second unit. The second unit is provided, and the agents go to the third
stage if and only if the sum of contributions to the second unit covers the marginal cost for that unit.
This continues till the sum of contributions to a one-unit increase falls short of the marginal cost for
that increase. We consider the mechanisms of Branzei et al. (2005) and Bagnoli and Lipman (1989)
as essentially the same because the decision on a one-unit increase of the public good is based on the
relationship between the marginal contribution and the marginal cost for that unit. In this paper, we
analyze the mechanism based on a simultaneous game.
We introduce equilibrium concepts for the unit-by-unit contribution game. Our analysis is restricted
to pure strategies. The Nash equilibrium is defined as usual.
For each D  N , denote a strategy profile for D by D 2 Qj2D Sj . We simply write N = .
A strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann, 1959) is a Nash equilibrium that is stable against all possible
coalition deviations.
Definition 1 Strategy profile  2 Qj2N Sj is a strong Nash equilibrium of   if there is no D  N and
0D 2
Q
j2D Sj such that Vj () < Vj (0D; NnD ) for all j 2 D.
A coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim et al., 1987) is also an equilibrium based on stability
against coordinated strategies. Unlike the strongNash equilibrium, the coalition-proofNash equilibrium
is limited to “self-enforcing” coalitional deviations. This equilibrium is based on the notion of a
restricted game. For all D ( N and all NnD 2 Qj2NnD Sj ,   jNnD is a restricted game of   at
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(D; NnD ) in which the agents in D plays  , taking as given that the other agents choose NnD; that
is,  jNnD is a list [D; (Si; ~Vi)i2D] in which D is a set of players for each i 2 D, Si = Ry+ is i’s strategy
set, and ~Vi is the payoﬀ function of i such that ~D 2 Qi2D Sj 7 ! ~Vi (~D )  Vi (~D; NnD ) 2 R.
Definition 2 A coalition-proof Nash equilibrium  2 Qj2N Sj is defined inductively with respect to
the number of agents n  1. Suppose that n = 1. Then,  2 Qj2N Sj is a coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium of   if  is a Nash equilibrium of  .
Suppose that n  2 and suppose that a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium has been defined for all
games with fewer than n agents.  2 Qj2N Sj is self-enforcing in   if it is a coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium of   jNnD for all nonempty D ( N .  2 Qj2N Sj is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
of   if it is self-enforcing in   and there is no other self-enforcing strategies 0 2 Qj2N Sj in   such
that Vj () < Vj (0) for all j 2 N .
The self-enforcing property of coalition-proof Nash equilibria restricts possible coalition deviations,
and hence the set of strong Nash equilibria is always a subset of the set of coalition-proof Nash
equilibria.
Since we assume that agents have quasi-linear utility functions, it would be appropriate to consider
coalition deviations through monetary transfers. Consider a situation in which a coalition D  N
deviates and each of its members freely sends transfer to other members. Let i 2 D and i 2 R be a net
transfer to agent i from the others: i is equal to the transfers i sends minus the transfers she receives.
There is no outside transfer resource; that is,
P
i2D i = 0. Based on this kind of transfers, we redefine
the strong Nash and coalition-proof Nash equilibria.
Definition 3 Strategy profile  2 Qj2N Sj is a strong Nash equilibrium with transfers of   if there is
no D  N , 0D 2
Q
j2D Sj and (j )j2D 2 R jD j such thatPj2D j = 0 and Vi () < Vi (0D; NnD ) + i
for all i 2 D.
Note that  is a strong Nash equilibrium with transfers if and only if there is no D  N and
0D 2
Q
j2D Sj such that
P
j2D Vj () <
P
j2D Vj (0D; NnD ). That is, no coalition can deviate from
a strong Nash equilibrium with transfers so as to increase the sum of payoﬀs of its members.
Definition 4 A coalition-proof Nash equilibrium with transfers  2 Qj2N Sj is defined inductively
with respect to the number of agents n  1. Suppose that n = 1. Then, 2 Qj2N Sj is a coalition-proof
Nash equilibrium with transfers of   if  is a Nash equilibrium of  .
Suppose that n  2 and suppose that a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium with transfers has been
defined for all games with fewer than n agents.  2 Qj2N Sj is self-enforcing with transfers in   if it is
a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium with transfers of  jNnD for all nonempty D ( N .  2 Qj2N Sj
is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium with transfers of   if it is self-enforcing with transfers in   and
there are no other self-enforcing strategies with transfers 0 2 Qj2N Sj in   and (j )j2N 2 Rn such
that
P
j2N j = 0 and Vi () < Vi (0D; NnD ) + i for all i 2 N .
Note that  2 Qj2N Sj is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium with transfers of   if and only if it is
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self-enforcing with transfers in   and there are no self-enforcing strategies with transfers 0 2 Qj2N Sj
such that
P
j2N Vj () <
P
j2N Vj (0).
About the strong Nash equilibrium, since monetary transfers increase the possibility of coalition
deviations, every strong Nash equilibrium with transfers is generally a strong Nash equilibrium, but
the converse is not necessarily true. However, the same does not apply to a coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium. The two sets of coalition-proof Nash equilibria may be disjoint. See Appendix C.
Remark 1 The remarks on the above equilibria are in order. (i) Every strong Nash equilibrium with
transfers is a strong Nash equilibrium, which in turn is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. (ii) Every
strong Nash equilibrium with transfers is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium with transfers. (iii) In  ,
no coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by other coalition-proof Nash equilibria. (iv)
There are never two distinct coalition-proof Nash equilibria with transfers that take diﬀerent values of
the sum of the payoﬀs to agents.
3 Results: Nonharmful public projects
We consider an economy in which agents undertake a project that is nonharmful for all agents in the
sense that the increase in project level does not harm any agent. This economy is formally defined as a
list [N; (ui)i2N; c] in which u j is weakly increasing in the project level for all j 2 N : for all j 2 N and
all y 2 Y,
u j (y + 1; y)  0 (3)
and c is weakly convex and increasing in the level (see (1)). We refer to this economy as e1.
Theorem 1 For an economy e1 = [N; (ui)i2N; c], in the unit-by-unit contribution game, (i) there is no
Nash equilibrium at which the project is undertaken over level y and (ii) the set of Nash equilibria at
which the project is undertaken at level y coincides with the sets of strong Nash equilibria with and
without transfers and the sets of coalition-proof Nash equilibria with and without transfers, and all sets
are nonempty.
The proof is provided in the appendix. The project levels at Nash equilibria may be multiple, but at
most y.8 Since strong Nash equilibria and coalition-proof Nash equilibria single out Nash equilibria
with eﬃcient project implementation levels, coordination possibilities modeled through those equilibria
successfully lead to eﬃcient allocation. In this sense, given coordination possibilities, the unit-by-unit
contribution mechanism is successful in the implementation of nonharmful projects.
Studies on the provision of integer-unit public goods have examined several distinct benefit functions.
Bagnoli and Lipmann (1989) andNishimura and Shinohara (2013) assume that agents’ benefit functions
are strictly increasing in the public good level. Moreover, Bagnoli and Lipmann (1989) impose strict
8 We can make an example in which the unit-by-unit contribution game may have Nash equilibria at which the project
is undertaken below y. For example, consider a case of Y = f0; 1; 2g, c(y) = 10y for all y 2 Y, N = f1; 2g, and
ui (1) = 7 and u2 (2) = 13 for all i 2 N .
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concavity on the benefit functions. Branzei et al. (2005) and Shinohara (2014) assume that every agent
i 2 N has a discontinuous benefit function such that there is a threshold level of the public good yi and
a positive constant value ui such that ui (y) = ui if y  yi and ui (y) = 0 otherwise. Obviously, all of the
benefit functions in the literature are examples of weakly increasing benefit functions. The existence
of Nash equilibria with eﬃcient projects, shown by Bagnoli and Lipmann (1989) and Branzei et al.
(2005), is extensible to the case in which agents have weakly increasing benefit functions.
By Theorem 1, we observe that the Nash equilibrium with an eﬃcient project is robust to several
types of coalitional deviations. This robustness property is stronger than the finding by Branzei et
al. (2005). This is because while Branzei et al. (2005) examine a strong Nash equilibrium (without
transfers), we examine four refined Nash equilibria, including a strong Nash equilibrium.9
4 Results: Harmful public projects
To what extent are the desirable properties of the unit-by-unit contribution mechanism, shown in
Theorem 1, satisfiedwhen implementing a public project that is sometimes harmful to some agents? We
consider an economy in which at least one agent has a benefit function that is not weakly increasing, that
is, an economy [N; (ui)i2N; c] in which there exist j 2 N and yj 2 Ynfyg such that u j (yj + 1; yj ) < 0
and c satisfies (1). In this economy, some agents such as agent j above do not always benefit from an
increase in the project level.
First, we provide examples to show that in this economy, the unit-by-unit contribution mechanism
may not achieve an eﬃcient project level at some refined Nash equilibria.
Example 1 Let Y = f0; 1; 2g. Let c(y) = 10y for all y 2 Y. Let N = f1; 2g. Suppose u1(1) = 4,
u1(2) = 1, u2(1) = 12, and u2(2) = 23. Then, y = 1 and Ymax = 2. First, we show that no Nash
equilibrium supports the eﬃcient undertaking of the project. Take  = (11; 
2
1;
1
2; 
2
2) such that
11 + 
1
2 = 10 and 
2
1 + 
2
2 < 10. In this , y() = 1. However, it cannot be a Nash equilibrium
because if agent 2 increases his marginal contribution to the second unit from 22 to 10 21 , then he is
made better oﬀ (note that u2(2; 1) > c(2; 1)  c(2; 1)   21 in this example). We can easily verify
that 0 2 Qj2N Sj such that 01 = (0; 0) and 02 = (10; 10) is a unique Nash equilibrium that is also
coalition-proof. Second, we can verify that no strong Nash equilibrium exists since 0 is not a strong
Nash equilibrium with or without transfers (consider a deviation by N from 0 to ~ 2 Qj2N Sj such
that (~11; ~
2
1) = (2; 0) and (~
1
2; ~
2
2) = (8; 0)).
Example 2 Let Y = f0; 1; 2g and c(y) = 10y. Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4g. Suppose that u1(1) = 7:5 and
u1(2) = 0 and that ui (1) = 6 and ui (2) = 12 for all i 2 Nnf1g. Then, y = Ymax = 2. In this example,
we show that there is no strong Nash equilibrium with transfers at which the project is undertaken at
level y, while there exists a strong Nash equilibrium.
9 In regard to the result in Branzei et al. (2005), it would be important to discuss whether a Nash equilibrium with an
eﬃcient project achieves the core of some cooperative game. This is because Branzei et al. (2005) show that utility
allocations attained at strong Nash equilibria are the core of a cooperative game. We can show that if agents have weakly
increasing benefit functions, all utility allocations at the strong Nash equilibria belong to the core of a cooperative game.
The proof is available upon request.
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We can find a strategy profile that is a strong Nash equilibria. For example, consider  2 Qj2N Sj
such that (11; 
1
1) = (0; 0), (
1
2; 
1
2) = (10; 0), and (
1
i ; 
1
i ) = (0; 5) for i = 3; 4, which is a strong
Nash equilibrium.
Second, we show that there exists no strong Nash equilibrium with transfers. Let  be a Nash
equilibrium such that y() = 2. Since u1(2) = 0 and  is a Nash equilibrium, we obtain (11; 
2
1) =
(0; 0). We further obtain
P
i2Nnf1g 
y
i = c(y; y 1) for all y 2 Ynf0g (see LemmaA1 in Appendix A).
At , V1() = 0 and Vi () = 12   1i   2i for all i 2 Nnf1g. Now, we consider a coalition f1; jg such
that j 2 Nnf1g and 2j > 0. Suppose that this coalition deviates from  to ~ f1; j g such that ~1 = 1 and
~ j = (1j ; 0). Then, y(~f1; j g; Nnf1; j g)=1 andV1(~f1; j g; Nnf1; j g)+Vj (~f1; j g; Nnf1; j g) = 7:5+6 1j .
Finally,
V1(~f1; j g; Nnf1; j g) + Vj (~ f1; j g; Nnf1; j g)  

V1() + Vj ()

= 1:5 + 2j > 0:
Thus, no strong Nash equilibrium with transfers exists.
In those examples, there is only one agent whose benefit function is not weakly increasing. Nev-
ertheless, the equilibria of the unit-by-unit contribution game have properties that are very diﬀerent
from those in Theorem 1. First, a Nash equilibrium may not support the eﬃcient project y (see
Example 1). Second, strong Nash equilibria with and without transfers may not exist. Moreover, no
strong Nash equilibrium with transfers may exist in either Ymax = y or Ymax > y. Third, although
coalition-proof Nash equilibria with and without transfers exist in those examples, they do not always
support an eﬃcient project.
By Examples 1 and 2, the unit-by-unit contribution mechanism does not necessarily achieve an
eﬃcient project at refined Nash equilibria, unlike in the implementation of nonharmful projects. In
particular, it is impossible for the mechanism to achieve eﬃciency through a strong Nash equilibrium
since it may not exist. We now focus on the coalition-proof Nash equilibria and examine to what extent
the unit-by-unit contribution mechanism achieves an eﬃcient project level in an economy with harmful
projects.
The condition that at least one agent does not have a weakly increasing benefit function seems very
weak, and hence we need to consider many economies for the analysis. For tractability, we focus on
a subclass of such economies, in which agents have weakly concave benefit functions. Formally, we
consider an economy e2 = [N; (ui)i2N; c] in which some agents do not have weakly increasing benefit
functions; that is, there exist j 2 N and yj 2 Ynfyg such that
u j (yj + 1; yj ) < 0; (4)
every agent has weakly concave benefit functions: for all i 2 N and all y; y0 2 Y such that y > y > y0,
ui (y + 1; y)  ui (y0 + 1; y0); (5)
and c is weakly convex and increasing (see (1)).
Note that there may be agents whose benefit functions are weakly increasing.
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Lemma 2 In economy e2, for all j 2 N , if u j satisfies (4), then there exists p( j) 2 Ynfyg such that
ui (y + 1; y)  0 for all y 2 Y such that y < p( j)
and ui (y + 1; y) < 0 for all y 2 Y such that y  p( j):
(6)
Proof. Suppose that u j satisfies (4). By a weak concavity of u j , u j (y + 1; y) < 0 for all y 2 Ynfyg
such that y  yj . Thus, if there exists y0 2 Ynf0; yg such thatu j (y0; y0 1)  0 andu j (y0+1; y0) < 0,
then we can define y0  p( j). Otherwise, p( j)  0. 
Our interpretation is that p( j) is the level of the public project that peaks agent j’s benefit from the
project. In this economy, every agent whose benefit function is not weakly increasing has a peaked
benefit function. For convenience, we also define this peak level of the project for all agents whose
benefit function is weakly increasing as follows: p(i)  y for all i 2 N such that ui (y + 1; y)  0 for
all y 2 Ynfyg. We further introduce some notations for the analysis. For all y 2 Y, let Ny  fi 2
N j p(i)  yg: the set of agents whose peak level is not less than y. Then, for all i 2 N and y 2 Ynf0g,
i 2 Ny if and only if ui (y; y   1)  0.
In this economy, although y is a unique eﬃcient level of the project, Ymax may not be equal to y.
We provide a necessary and suﬃcient condition under which Ymax = y in Lemma 3, which would be
useful for subsequent analyses.
Lemma 3 In economy e2, Ymax = y if and only ifX
j2N y+1
u j (y + 1; y) < c(y + 1; y): (7)
Proof. (() By the definition of Ymax, y  Ymax. Suppose, to the contrary, that y + 1  Ymax. Let
D  N be such that Y (D) = Ymax. Then, Pj2D u j (Y (D); y) > c(Y (D); y).
Note that
P
j2D u j (y + 1; y)  Pj2N y+1 u j (y + 1; y). This inequality, together with (1), (5),
and (7), implies that for all y 2 Y such that y  y + 1,X
j2D
u j (y + 1; y) 
X
j2D
u j (y + 1; y) < c(y + 1; y)  c(y + 1; y):
Finally, we obtain
P
j2D u j (Y (D); y) < c(Y (D); y), which is a contradiction.
()) Ymax = y implies that Y (Ny+1)  y. Since Y (Ny+1) is the unique maximizer ofP
j2N y+1 u j (y)   c(y),X
j2N y+1
u j (Y (Ny
+1) + 1;Y (Ny
+1)) < c(Y (Ny
+1) + 1;Y (Ny
+1)):
By (1), (5), and Y (Ny+1)  y,X
j2N y+1
u j (y + 1; y) 
X
j2N y+1
u j (Y (Ny
+1) + 1;Y (Ny
+1))
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and
c(Y (Ny
+1) + 1;Y (Ny
+1))  c(y + 1; y):
Thus, we obtain (7). 
Lemma 4 is a preparation for subsequent analyses.
Lemma 4 In economy e2, Pi2N y ui (y; y   1) > c(y; y   1) for all y 2 Y such that 1  y  y.
Proof. By Lemma 1, Pi2N ui (y; y   1) > c(y; y   1). Since Pi<N y ui (y; y   1) < 0 (if
Ny

, ;),X
i2N
ui (y; y   1) =
X
i2N y
ui (y; y   1) +
X
i<N y
ui (y; y   1) 
X
i2N y
ui (y; y   1):
Thus,
P
i2N y ui (y; y  1) > c(y; y 1). By (1) and (5), we obtain the condition in the statement
of this lemma. 
4.1 Nash equilibria and Pareto eﬃciency
As Examples 1 and 2 show, the unit-by-unit contribution game may or may not have a Nash equilibrium
that undertakes the project eﬃciently in economy e2. Hence, we investigate under which conditions
the unit-by-unit contribution game has such a Nash equilibrium in e2.
By Lemma 4, we can construct a strategy profile  2 Qj2N Sj such that:
If y + 1  y  y; then yi = 0 for all i 2 N :
If 1  y  y; then yi = 0 for all i < Ny

; 0  yi < ui (y; y   1) for all i 2 Ny

;
and
X
i2N y

y
i = c(y; y   1):
(8)
At , the project is undertaken eﬃciently. However, as we can easily check, while it is a Nash
equilibrium in Example 2, it is not in Example 1. Hence, some conditions are needed for it to be a Nash
equilibrium. Profile  plays an important role in establishing a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
a Nash equilibrium to achieve the eﬃcient project level.
Proposition 1 In economy e2, the unit-by-unit contribution game has a Nash equilibrium at which the
project is undertaken eﬃciently if and only if
ui (y + 1; y)  c(y + 1; y) for all i 2 N : (9)
The proof is provided in the appendix. Whether a Nash equilibrium with an eﬃcient project level
exists depends on the relationship between the marginal benefits of each agent and marginal cost for
the y + 1-th unit of the project. We can intuitively understand (9). If (9) holds, no agent gains from a
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one-unit increase in the project level from y units. Hence, without (9), no Nash equilibrium supports
an eﬃcient project level.
Corollary 1 establishes a suﬃcient condition under which the unit-by-unit contribution game has a
Nash equilibrium with an eﬃcient project.
Corollary 1 In economy e2, if Ymax = y, then there is a Nash equilibrium at which the project is
undertaken at the level y.
Proof. Ymax = y implies (7), which in turn implies (9). Thus, by Proposition 1, a Nash equilibrium
exists such that the public project is provided eﬃciently. 
It is easily seen that Ymax = y is not a necessary condition for a Nash equilibrium to support an
eﬃcient project.
As Example 1 shows, in economy e2, there may be a Nash equilibrium that supports over-
implementation of the project in the unit-by-unit contribution game. Proposition 2 provides a necessary
and suﬃcient condition for an economy under which the project is implemented over the eﬃcient level
at a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2 In economy e2, there exists a Nash equilibrium at which the project is undertaken over
the eﬃcient level y if and only if Ymax > y:
The proof is provided in the appendix. We can intuitively interpret Ymax > y. Ymax > y if and
only if Y (D) > y for some D ( N . Coalition D can undertake the public project at the level Y (D)
by itself since
P
j2D u j (y; y   1)  c(y; y   1) for all y 2 Y such that 1  y  Y (D). Thus,
there exists a proper subgroup of N that can undertake the project over y. In conclusion, whether
over-implementation of the project is supported at a Nash equilibrium depends on the existence of such
a subgroup.
Theorem 2 summarizes the results in subsection 4.1, which is direct fromCorollary 1 and Proposition
2.
Theorem 2 In economy e2, (i) if Ymax = y, then there exists a Nash equilibrium that supports the
eﬃcient project, but there is no Nash equilibrium at which the project is undertaken over the eﬃcient
level. (ii) If Ymax > y, there exists a Nash equilibrium with over-implementation of the project, and
there may be a Nash equilibrium that supports the eﬃcient project.
Remarks about Theorem 2 are in order. First, in the case of Ymax = y, there may be a Nash
equilibrium that supports underprovision of the public project. Second, in the case of Ymax > y,
there may be a Nash equilibrium with eﬃcient project implementation. Thus, as in economy e1, the
unit-by-unit contribution mechanism may face multiplicity of Nash equilibria that support diﬀerent
project levels in economy e2.
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4.2 Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and Pareto eﬃciency
WeexaminewhichNash equilibria are coalition-proof bothwith andwithout transfers in the unit-by-unit
contribution game in economy e2. Lemma 5 is a preliminary for the analysis.
Lemma 5 There exists ~M  N that satisfies
u j (y; y   1) > 0 for all j 2 ~M and for all y 2 Y such that 1  y  Ymax; (10)
and
X
j2 ~M
u j (y; y   1) > c(y; y   1) for all y 2 Y such that 1  y  Ymax: (11)
The proof is provided in the appendix. LetM  N be the “largest” set that satisfies (10) and (11)
in the sense that no other sets satisfy these conditions or includeM. By these conditions, we can find
 2 Rny+ such that
If Ymax + 1  y  y; then yi = 0 for all i 2 N :
If 1  y  Ymax; then yi = 0 for all i <M; 0 < yi < ui (y; y   1) for all i 2 M;
and
X
j2M

y
j = c(y; y   1):
(12)
By (12), for all j 2 M,
u j (Ymax; y^   1) >
YmaxX
y=y^

y
j for all y^ 2 Y such that 1  y^  Ymax: (13)
In the proof of Proposition 3, provided in the appendix, we show that  in (12) is a coalition-proof
Nash equilibrium with and without transfers.
Proposition 3 In economy e2, the unit-by-unit contribution game has coalition-proof Nash equilibria
with and without transfers at which the project is undertaken at the level Ymax.
The proof is provided in the appendix. Although the unit-by-unit contribution game may not have
strong Nash equilibria with or without transfers, it always has coalition-proof Nash equilibria with
and without transfers. The self-enforcing property of coalition deviations guarantees the existence of
coalition-proof Nash equilibria. It would be useful to again consider Example 1 in order to intuitively
understand how this property works. Recall that y = 1 and Ymax = 2 in this example. Recall also that
0 = (011 ; 
02
1 ;
01
2 ; 
02
2 ) = (0; 0; 10; 10) is the Nash equilibrium, but it is not a strong Nash equilibrium
because N has a profitable deviation ~ = (~11; ~
2
1; ~
1
2; ~
2
2) = (2; 0; 8; 0) from 
0. By this deviation,
the project level declines from y(0) = 2 to y(~) = 1. However, this deviation is not self-enforcing
because agent 2 is willing to get the project level back to two units after the deviation. This is because
agent 2’s marginal benefit from the second unit is greater than the marginal cost for the unit. When the
self-enforcing property matters, agents 1 and 2 do not agree with the first joint deviation to decrease the
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project level. In general, in the unit-by-unit contribution game in economy e2, the deviation to decrease
the project level from Ymax is not self-enforcing (see the proof of Proposition 3 for details).
The next proposition shows that no coalition-proof Nash equilibrium supports the public project
under Ymax.
Proposition 4 Suppose that there exists a Nash equilibrium ^ 2 Rny+ such that y(^) < Ymax in the
unit-by-unit contribution game in economy e2. Then, ^ is not a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium with
or without transfers.
The proof is provided in the appendix. As Proposition 3 shows, there is a coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium at which the project is undertaken at the level Ymax. This, together with (13), implies that
agents inM have a self-enforcing deviation from ^ in a way that increases the project level from y(^)
to Ymax and makes all of them better oﬀ (see the proof of Proposition 4 for details).
Theorem3 summarizes underwhat condition a coalition-proofNash equilibriumachieves the eﬃcient
project level.
Theorem 3 In economy e2, (i) the project is undertaken at the level y at all coalition-proof Nash
equilibria with and without transfers if Ymax = y. (ii) The project is undertaken over the eﬃcient level
at all coalition-proof Nash equilibria if Ymax > y.
The proof is provided in the appendix. When the project is harmful for some agents, a Nash
equilibrium itself may not support the eﬃcient project. In some cases, multiple Nash equilibria
support both eﬃcient implementation and over-implementation of the project. In these cases, no Nash
equilibrium with the eﬃcient project is robust to coalition deviations. No strong Nash equilibria may
exist. Coalition-proof Nash equilibria with and without transfers always exist, but they single out the
Nash equilibrium with over-implementation of the project. These results diﬀer greatly from those for
nonharmful project implementation.
4.3 A modified mechanism
At the discussion after Proposition 2, we mention that Ymax > y means the existence of a group
that can over-implement the project. If such a group exists, agents outsider this group cannot prevent
the over-implementation of the project because they can announce only nonnegative contributions for
each one-unit increase. Now, we modify the unit-by-unit contribution mechanism in such a way that
agents can announce negative numbers for each one-unit increase. Let Si  Ry for each i 2 N . For
each  2 Qj2N Sj , the level of the project y() is defined as the same as (2). For each i 2 N and
(yi )y2Ynf0g 2 Si , (tyi (yi ))y2Ynf0g is defined as a vector of i’s actual contributions for each one-unit
increase such that for each y 2 Ynf0g, tyi (yi ) = yi if yi  0 and tyi (yi ) takes a positive value
otherwise. For each  2 Qj2N Sj and each i 2 N , Vi () = ui (y())  Py2Ynf0g tyi (yi ). Note that by
this modification, agents can prevent any one-unit increase if they announce suﬃciently small negative
numbers.
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We can intuitively understand this modified mechanism that for each one-unit increase, each agent
is asked to announce “willingness to pay” for carrying out the increase (a positive number) or that for
preventing it (a negative number). Whether the project increases by one unit depends upon the sum of
the announced willingness-to-pay. For any one-unit increase, if agents announce a positive value for
that increase, they make the same payment as their announcement. Otherwise, their actual payment
for that increase can be any positive value. There are some examples about how to set the actual
contributions for negative numbers. For example, consider that tyi (
y
i ) = jyi j when yi < 0. In this
example, agents who announce a negative number for some one-unit increase pay the absolute value
of their willingness to pay for preventing that increase. We can consider another example in which for
each y 2 Ynf0g, tyi (yi ) = " for some positive constant " when yi < 0. We can intuitively understand
that " is a “fine” for announcing a negative number. It is enough that " is very close to zero.
Proposition 5 In some economy e2, no Nash equilibrium supports the eﬃcient implement of the public
project in the modified unit-by-unit contribution mechanism.
The proof is provided in the appendix.
In this mechanism, if agents announce negative values for some one-unit increase, then their payment
for that increase can take any positive value. In this sense, this modified mechanism seems to constitute
a reasonably large class of modification of the unit-by-unit contribution mechanisms. By Proposition
5, we confirm that introducing negative contributions to the unit-by-unit contribution mechanism is
not suﬃcient for the eﬃcient undertaking of the project. We also confirm that if agents announce
negative numbers for some one-unit increase, then they are subsidized to some extent, but not asked to
contribute.
5 Conclusion
The unit-by-unit contribution mechanism seems suitable for the implementation of integer-unit public
projects and applicable, to some extent, for public project initiatives in the real world. Hence, it is
important that we understand how this mechanism works in the implementation of various public
projects. However, this issue has received only limited attention. Our aim is to examine to what extent
this mechanism achieves Pareto eﬃciency in the implementation of public projects. We consider not
only a project that is nonharmful for all agents but also one that is not.
Our results are as follows. The mechanism works well in an economy in which the project is
nonharmful for all agents. In this economy, the mechanism achieves an eﬃcient project level only at
a strong Nash equilibrium and a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium with and without transfers. In this
sense, given various coalitional behaviors, the mechanism achieves eﬃciency. On the other hand, in
other economies, the mechanism does not always work well. When the project is harmful for some
agents, the unit-by-unit contribution mechanism does not necessarily have a Nash equilibrium with an
eﬃcient project. Even if the mechanism has such a Nash equilibrium, it is not necessarily supported
at a strong Nash equilibrium or a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. We introduce a reasonable class
of modified unit-by-unit contribution mechanisms, but no mechanism in this class achieve implements
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eﬃcient public project in Nash equilibria. We conclude that the unit-by-unit contribution mechanism
should be used only for public projects that benefit all agents. In order to achieve an eﬃcient project
level that is harmful for some, we need to consider another class of modified unit-by-unit contribution
mechanism or construct a completely new mechanism to undertake public projects. This is left for
future research.
Appendix A: Preliminary results
In Appendix A, we examine a unit-by-unit contribution game without (1), (3), or (5). Instead of these
conditions, we impose other conditions on the benefit and cost functions in each of subsequent lemmas.
The results obtained in this appendix are applied to prove the results in the main text.
Let  0 = [N ; (Si;Vi)i2N ] be a unit-by-unit contribution game where N is the set of agents, Si
is i’s set of strategies such that Si = R
y
+, and Vi :
Q
j2N Sj ! R is i’s payoﬀ function such that
N 2 Qj2N Sj 7 ! Vi (N )  ui (y(N ))   Pyy=1 yi 2 R where y : Qj2N Sj ! Y is a mapping
assigning a level of the public project with each strategy profile, which is defined in the same way as
(2) in the main text. We assume that for all y 2 Y, c(y)  0 and for all y 2 Ynf0g, c(y; y   1) 
maxf0; c(y)   c(y   1)g. However, we do not impose any of (1), (3), and (5) on  0.
A.1 Results of Nash equilibria of  0
LemmaA1 shows that the contributions at every Nash equilibrium satisfy the budget balance condition.
Lemma A1 Suppose that N 2 R jN jy+ is a Nash equilibrium of  0. Then,X
j2N

y
j = c(y; y   1) for all y 2 Y such that 1  y  y(N ) if y(N )  1: (14)

y
j = 0 for all j 2 N and all y 2 Y such that y  y(N ) + 1 if y(N ) + 1  y: (15)
Proof. Proof of (14). Since the project is undertaken at the level y(N ) atN ,
P
j2N 
y
j  c(y; y 1)
for all y 2 Y such that 1  y  y(). Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists ~y 2 Y such that 1 
~y  y() andPj2N ~yj > c(~y; ~y 1). Then, clearly, there exists i 2 N such that ~yi > 0. Even if this
agent i decreases his contribution to ~y-th unit from ~yi to 
0~y
i = max
(
0; c(~y; ~y   1)  Pj2Nnfi g ~yj ) ;
he can still enjoy the project at the level y(~N ) while his total contribution decreases. Hence, he is
made better oﬀ by this deviation, which contradicts the supposition that N is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of (15). Suppose that there exist j 2 N and ~y 2 Y such that ~y  y(N ) + 1 and ~yj > 0.
If agent j switches from ~yj to 
0~y
j = 0, the level of the project does not change. Hence, by this
switch, agent j can still enjoy the project at the level y(N ) as well as reduce his contribution, which
contradicts the supposition that N is a Nash equilibrium. 
Lemma A2 proves that at every Nash equilibrium, under some condition, marginal contributions do
not exceed the marginal benefit from the increase of the public project.
18
Lemma A2 Suppose thatN 2 R jN jy+ is a Nash equilibrium of  0. Suppose also thatu j (y; y 1)  0
for all j 2 N and all y 2 Y such that 1  y  y(N ). Then,
u j (y(N ); y0) 
y()X
y=y0+1

y
j for all j 2 N and for all y0 2 Y such that y0  y(N )   1: (16)
Proof. The proof is obtained by induction. Let i 2 N . Suppose, to the contrary, that
ui (y(N ); y(N )   1) < y(N )i :
Then, y(N )i > 0. If i reduces his contribution to the y()-th unit to zero, the level of
the project decreases to y(N )   1 by (14) of Lemma A1 and his payoﬀ increases by

y(N )
i   ui (y(N ); y(N )   1) > 0, which contradicts the supposition that N is a Nash
equilibrium.
Let y0 2 Y be such that 1  y0  y(N )   1. Suppose, as an induction hypothesis, that
ui (y(N ); y0)  Py(N )y=y0+1 yi . Then, we show that ui (y(N ); y0   1)  Py(N )y=y0 yi . Suppose,
to the contrary, that ui (y(N ); y0   1) < Py(N )y=y0 yi . By this inequality,
ui
 
y(N ); y0
   y(N )X
y=y0+1

y
i + ui (y
0; y0   1) < y0i :
By this condition and the induction hypothesis, ui (y0; y0   1) < y
0
i . By ui (y
0; y0   1)  0, we
obtain y
0
i > 0. Let ~i 2 Ry+ be i’s deviation strategy from  such that ~yi = yi if 1  y  y0   1
and ~yi = 0 otherwise. Since 
y0
i > 0, the project is undertaken at the level y
0   1 at (~i; Nnfi g) and
Vi (~i; Nnfi g) = ui (y0 1) Py0 1y=1 yi . We obtainVi (N ) Vi (~i; Nnfi g) = ui (y(N ); y0   1) Py(N )
y=y0 
y
i < 0, which contradicts the supposition that N is a Nash equilibrium. 
Lemma A3 provides a suﬃcient condition of a Nash equilibrium in  0.
Lemma A3 Let N 2 R jN jy+ . Suppose that for all j 2 N ,
u j (y; y   1)  0 for all y 2 Y such that 1  y  y(N ) (17)
and u j (y; y(N ))  c(y; y(N )) for all y 2 Y such that y  y(N ) + 1. (18)
Suppose also that N satisfies (14)–(16). Then, N is a Nash equilibrium of  0.
Proof. Let j 2 N and let ^ j 2 Ry+ be a deviation strategy of j from . First, we consider the
case of y(^ j; Nnf j g)  y() + 1. Since by this deviation, the level of the project increases from
y() to y(^ j; Nnf j g) and N satisfies (15), then j contributes at least c

y(^ j; Nnf j g); y()

to
this increase. Moreover, by (14), j cannot reduce his contributions from the first to y()-th unit to
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undertake the project at the level y(^ j; Nnf j g). Thus,
yX
y=1
^
y
j 
y()X
y=1

y
j + c

y(^ j; Nnf j g); y()

: (19)
By (18), c

y(^ j; Nnf j g); y()

 u j

y(^ j; Nnf j g); y()

. Then, by (19),
yX
y=1
^
y
j 
y()X
y=1

y
j + u j

y(^ j; Nnf j g); y()

or, equivalently,
u j (y())  
y()X
y=1

y
j  u j

y(^ j; Nnf j g)

 
yX
y=1
^
y
j :
In this condition, the left-hand side is the payoﬀ to j before the deviation and the right-hand side is the
one after the deviation. Hence, j is not made better oﬀ by this deviation.
Second, we consider the case of y(^ j; Nnf j g)  y()   1. Since y(^ j; Nnf j g) units of the project
are undertaken,

y
j  ^yj for all y 2 Y such that 1  y  y(^ j; Nnf j g) and 
y(^j;Nnf j g )+1
j > ^
y(^j;Nnf j g )+1
j :
The maximal payoﬀ to agent j by this deviation is u j

y(^ j; Nnf j g)

  Py(^j;Nnf j g )y=1 yj , which is
obtained if ^yj = 
y
j for all y 2 Y such that 1  y  y(^ j; Nnf j g) and ^yj = 0 for all y 2 Y such that
y(^ j; Nnf j g) + 1  y  y. The payoﬀ to agent j before this deviation is u j (y(N ))   Py(N )y=1 yj ,
while that after the deviation is at most u j

y(^ j; Nnf j g)

 Py(^j;Nnf j g )y=1 yj . Clearly,
u j (y(N ))  
y(N )X
y=1

y
j  u j

y(^ j; Nnf j g)

 
y(^j;Nnf j g )X
y=1

y
j
because u j

y(N ); y(^ j; Nnf j g)

 Py(N )
y=y(^j;Nnf j g )+1 
y
j by (16). Thus, agent j is not made better
oﬀ by this deviation. 
A.2 Results of strong Nash equilibria of  0
Similarly to the main text, let Y (D) 2 argmaxy2Y Pj2D u j (y)   c(y) for all D  N and let
Ymax  maxDN Y (D).
Lemma A4 Let N 2 R jN jy+ be a Nash equilibrium such that y(N ) = Ymax. Suppose thatX
j2E
u j (y;Ymax)  c(y;Ymax) for all E  N and all y 2 Y such that y  Ymax + 1: (20)
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If a coalition D  N has deviation strategies 0D 2 R jD jy+ such that y(0D; NnD )  Ymax + 1, thenP
j2DVj (N )  Pj2DVj (0D; NnD ).
Proof. Let y0  y(0D; NnD ). Suppose, to the contrary, that
P
j2DVj (0D; NnD ) >P
j2DVj (N ). By this inequality,
X
j2D
u j (y0;Ymax) >
X
j2D
YmaxX
y=1
(0yj   yj ) +
X
j2D
yX
y=Ymax+1

0y
j :
Since the project is undertaken at the level y0 and Ymax < y0, we obtain
P
j2D
PYmax
y=1 (
0y
j   yj )  0;
otherwise, y0 units are never provided. Consequently,
X
j2D
u j (y0;Ymax) >
X
j2D
yX
y=Ymax+1

0y
j ; (21)
On the other hand, by (20), we obtain
P
j2D u j (y0;Ymax)  c(y0;Ymax): Since the project is
undertaken at the level y0 by this deviation and y0  y,
c(y0;Ymax) 
X
j2D
y0X
y=Ymax+1

0y
i 
X
j2D
yX
y=Ymax+1

0y
i :
Thus, X
j2D
u j (y0;Ymax) 
X
j2D
yX
y=Ymax+1

0y
i ;
which contradicts (21). 
Lemma A5 Suppose that (20) and
u j (y; y   1)  0 for all j 2 N and all y 2 Y such that 1  y  Ymax: (22)
Then, every Nash equilibrium at which the project is undertaken at the level Ymax is a strong Nash
equilibrium with transfers of  0.
Proof. Let N 2 R jN jy+ be a Nash equilibrium such that y(N ) = Ymax. By (22) and Lemmas A1
and A2, X
j2N

y
j = c(y; y   1) for all y 2 Y such that 1  y  Ymax;

y
j = 0 for all j 2 N and all y 2 Y such that y  y(Ymax) + 1; and (23)
u j (Ymax; y^) 
YmaxX
y=y^+1

y
j for all j 2 N and for all y^ 2 Y such that y^  Ymax   1: (24)
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Suppose, to the contrary, that there exist a coalition D  N and 0D 2 R jD jy+ such thatX
j2D
Vj (N ) <
X
j2D
Vj (0D; NnD ): (25)
Let y0 2 Y be the level of the public project that deviates by D: y0  y(0D; NnD ). By Lemma
A4, if y0  Ymax + 1, then it is impossible that Pj2DVj (N ) < Pj2DVj (0D; NnD ). It is trivial
that if y0 = Ymax, then the deviation by D is not improving. Finally, we need to consider the case of
y0  Ymax   1. By (25), X
j2D
u j (Ymax; y0) <
X
j2D
yX
y=1
(yj   0yj ):
Since the deviation by D attains y0, Pj2D Py0y=1 yj  Pj2D Py0y=1 0yj . By this inequality,
X
j2D
yX
y=1
(yj   0yj ) =
X
j2D
y0X
y=1
(yj   0yj ) +
X
j2D
yX
y=y0+1
(yj   0yj )

X
j2D
yX
y=y0+1
(yj   0yj ) 
X
j2D
yX
y=y0+1

y
j =
X
j2D
YmaxX
y=y0+1

y
j :
The last equality follows from (23). Combining these two conditions yields
X
j2D
u j (Ymax; y0) <
X
j2D
YmaxX
y=y0+1

y
j :
However, by (24),
P
j2D u j (Ymax; y0)  Pj2D PYmaxy=y0+1 yj , which is a contradiction.
In conclusion, no coalition can jointly deviate from N in a way that improves the sum of payoﬀs of
its members. 
Appendix B: Proofs of the results in the main text
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider a unit-by-unit contribution game   = [N; (Si;Vi)i2N ] in economy e1.
We consider a case in whichN = N andVi = Vi for all i 2 N and apply Lemmas A1, A3, A4, and A5
to  . Claims 1 and 2 are basic properties of economy e1.
Claim 1 In economy e1, Ymax = y.
Proof of Claim 1. By the definition of Ymax, y  Ymax. Suppose that y < Ymax. Since fyg =
argmaxy2Y
P
j2N u j (y)   c(y), thenPj2N u j (Ymax; y) < c(Ymax; y). Then, there exists D ( N
such that Y (D) = Ymax and
P
j2D u j (Ymax; y)  c(Ymax; y). In conclusion,X
j2D
u j (Ymax; y)  c(Ymax; y) >
X
j2N
u j (Ymax; y):
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However, it is impossible that
P
j2D u j (Ymax; y) >
P
j2N u j (Ymax; y) because D ( N and
u j (y; y   1)  0 for all j 2 N and all y 2 Y such that y  1. Hence, Ymax = y in e1. j j
Claim 2 In economy e1, (20) in Lemma A4 holds.
Proof of Claim 2. By Claim 1,Ymax = y. Since y is the unique maximizer of
P
j2N u j (y) c(y), thenP
j2N u j (y; y) < c(y; y) for all y 2 Y such that y  y + 1. For all such y, since u j (y; y)  0
for all j 2 N , we have Pj2E ui (y; y)  Pj2N u j (y; y) for all E  N . Thus, for all E  N and all
y 2 Y such that y  y + 1,X
j2E
ui (y; y) 
X
j2N
u j (y; y) < c(y; y):
Hence, (20) in Lemma A4 holds. j j
Proof of Theorem 1(i). Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists a Nash equilibrium  2 Rny+
such that y() > y. By the eﬃciency of y,
P
j2N u j (y(); y) < c(y(); y). Since  is a
Nash equilibrium, we obtain c(y(); y) =
P
j2N
Py()
y=y+1 
y
j by (14). By these two conditions,P
j2N u j (y(); y) <
P
j2N
Py()
y=y+1 
y
j . This condition implies that there must be l 2 N such that
0  ul (y(); y) < Py()y=y+1 yl . Now, consider a deviation by agent l such that she makes the
same contributions from the first to the y-th unit and she makes no contributions to the level over y.
If we denote the level after such a deviation by y0, then y0 2 fy; : : : ; y()   1g, and agent l gainsPy()
y=y+1 
y
l
  ul (y(); y0) > 0,10 which contradicts the supposition that  is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 1(ii). First, we show that there is a Nash equilibrium at which the project is
undertaken at the level y.
Claim 3 There exists  2 Rny+ such that

y
j = 0 for all j 2 N and all y 2 Y such that y > y;X
j2N

y
j = c(y; y   1) for all y 2 Y such that 1  y  y; (26)
and u j (y; y^) 
yX
y=y^+1

y
j for all j 2 N and all y 2 Y such that 0  y^  y   1:
Proof of Claim 3. Obviously, we can set yj = 0 for all j 2 N and all y 2 Y such that y > y.
We construct (yj )j2N for all y such that 1  y  y by induction. We start with y = y. By
Lemma 1, we obtain
P
j2N u j (y; y   1) > c(y; y   1): Thus, there exists (y

j )j2N 2 Rn+ such
that X
j2N

y
j = c(y
; y   1) and u j (y; y   1)  y

j for all j 2 N :
10 Note that ul (y(); y0)  ul (y(); y) < Py ()y=y+1 yl .
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Given this (y

j )j2N , we next construct (
y 1
j )j2N .
Let y^ 2 Y be such that 1  y^  y 1. Suppose that (yj )j2N has been constructed for all y 2 Y such
that y^ + 1  y  y. We now construct (y^j )j2N . By Lemma 1,
P
j2N u j (y; y^   1) > c(y; y^   1).
This condition is equivalent toX
j2N
u j (y; y^) +
X
j2N
u j ( y^; y^   1) > c(y; y^) + c( y^; y^   1)
=
yX
y=y^+1
X
j2N

y
j + c( y^; y^   1):
Thus, X
j2N
2666664u j (y; y^)  
yX
y=y^+1

y
j
3777775 +
X
j2N
u j ( y^; y^   1) > c( y^; y^   1)
By the induction hypothesis, u j (y; y^)  Pyy=y^+1 yj  0 for all j 2 N . Hence, there exists (y^j )j2N
such that
X
j2N

y^
j = c( y^; y^   1) and u j (y; y^   1)  
yX
y=y^+1

y
j  y^j for all j 2 N :
j j
At , the project is undertaken at the level y. Note that  satisfies all conditions in Lemma A3;
hence, it is a Nash equilibrium.
Claim 4 Every Nash equilibrium at which the project is undertaken at y is a strong Nash equilibrium
with transfers.
Proof of Claim 4. First, note that (22) in Lemma A5 holds since u j (y; y   1)  0 for all j 2 N and
all y 2 Y such that y  1. Second, by Claim 2, (20) in Lemma A4 holds. Thus, by Lemma A5, every
Nash equilibrium at which the project is undertaken at the level y is a strong Nash equilibrium with
transfers. j j
By Claim 4 and Remark 1, with and without transfers, every Nash equilibrium at which the project
is undertaken at y is a strong Nash equilibrium and a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. Note that by
the definitions of strong Nash equilibria with and without transfers, all strong Nash equilibria with and
without transfers must be Nash equilibria at which the project is undertaken at the level y. Hence,
the sets of these two strong Nash equilibria coincide with the set of Nash equilibrium with eﬃcient
implementation of the project.
Claim 5 All coalition-proof Nash equilibria with and without transfers are strong Nash equilibria with
transfers.
Proof of Claim 5. First, we show that every coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (without transfers) is
a strong Nash equilibrium with transfers. Since the sets of strong Nash equilibria with and without
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transfers coincide, it is enough to show that without transfers, every coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is
a strong Nash equilibrium. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
 2 Rny+ that is not a strong Nash equilibrium. Since the set of strong Nash equilibria coincides with
that of Nash equilibria at which y is the level of the project, y() must be an ineﬃcient level of the
project. Hence, y() < y and
P
j2N u j (y; y()) > c(y; y()). Similarly to the construction of
 in (26), we construct (0yj )j2N for all y 2 Y such that y() + 1  y  y as follows:
• 0yj = 0 for all j 2 N and all y 2 Y such that y > y.
•
P
j2N 
0y
j = c(y; y   1) for all y 2 Y such that y() + 1  y  y.
• u j (y; y^)  Pyy=y^+1 0yj for all j 2 N and all y^ 2 Y such that y()  y^  y   1.
• u j (y; y()) >
Py
y=y()+1 
0y
j for all j 2 N .
The last condition follows from
P
j2N u j (y; y()) > c(y; y()). Combining (
0y
j )
y
y=y()+1 with
(yj )
y()
y=1 for all j 2 N , we make a new strategy profile ~  ((yj )y()y=1 ; (0yj )yy=y()+1)j2N . At ~, the
project is undertaken at the level y and by Lemma A3, it is a Nash equilibrium. By Lemma A5, ~ is
a strong Nash equilibrium with transfers and hence, ~ is also coalition-proof without transfers. Since
u j (y; y()) >
Py
y=y()+1 
0y
j for all j 2 N , ~ Pareto dominates . By Definition 2,  cannot be a
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, which is a contradiction (see Remark 1(iii)).
Finally, note that we can show similarly that every coalition-proof Nash equilibrium with transfers
is a strong Nash equilibrium with transfers. j j
In conclusion, we obtain that the five equilibrium sets coincide. 
Proof of Proposition 1. (() We show  2 Rny+ constructed in (8) is a Nash equilibrium. First, note
that by (1), (5), and (9),
u j (y + 1; y)  c(y + 1; y) for all j 2 N and all y 2 Y such that y  y: (27)
Considering the game  0 with N = Ny , we apply Lemma A3 to the game   j
NnN y . Clearly, we
have u j (y; y   1)  0 for all j 2 Ny and all y 2 Y such that 1  y  y; hence, (17) holds at
N = N y . By (27), (18) holds at N = 

N y
 . (14)–(16) hold by the construction of 
N y
 . Thus,
by Lemma A3, 
N y
 is a Nash equilibrium of   j
NnN y .
By (27), no agent outside Ny is made better oﬀ if he unilaterally increases his contribution in such
a way that the project is undertaken over the level y. Also, no agent outside Ny is made better oﬀ if
he increases contributions to the level under y because the contributions from agents in Ny already
cover the cost of y units. In conclusion,  is a Nash equilibrium of the unit-by-unit contribution
game.
()) Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists a Nash equilibrium  such that y() = y and that
u j (y + 1; y) > c(y + 1; y) for some j 2 N . By applying Lemma A1, we have y
+1
i = 0 for all
i 2 N . Clearly, if agent j switches from y+1j = 0 to ~y
+1
j = c(y
 + 1; y), then his payoﬀ increases
by u j (y + 1; y)   c(y + 1; y) > 0, which is a contradiction. 
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Proof of Proposition 2. ()) Suppose that there exists a Nash equilibrium  such that y() > y
but Ymax  y. Since Ymax < y(), then Y (D) < y() for all D  N . Note especially that
Y (Ny()) < y().
Since  is a Nash equilibrium, then y()j = 0 for all j 2 NnNy(): if y()j > 0 for some
j 2 NnNy() , agent j is made better oﬀ by deviating from  in a way that changes her contribution to
the y()-th unit to zero and takes the same contribution to the other units as  j .11 Thus,
c(y(); y()   1) =
X
j2N y ()

y()
j :
By the properties of Nash equilibria in Lemma A2, we obtain u j (y(); y()   1)  y()j for all
j 2 Ny() , implying X
j2N y ()
u j (y(); y()   1)  c(y(); y()   1):
By the weak concavity of u j and the weak convexity of c, for all y 2 Y such that y  y(),X
j2N y ()
u j (y; y   1) 
X
j2N y ()
u j (y(); y()   1)  c(y(); y()   1)  c(y; y   1):
These inequalities imply thatY (Ny()) < y() never holds; by these inequalities, ifY (Ny()) < y(),
then Y (Ny()) cannot be a unique maximizer of
P
j2N y () u j (y)   c(y).
(() Let D  N be such that Y (D) = Ymax. By the definition of Y (D), Pj2D u j (Ymax;Ymax  
1) > c(Ymax;Ymax   1): Since u j (Ymax;Ymax   1) < 0 for all j 2 NnNYmax , thenP
j2D\NYmax u j (Ymax;Ymax   1) > c(Ymax;Ymax   1). By this inequality, the weak concav-
ity of u j , and the weak convexity of c,X
j2D\NYmax
u j (y; y   1) > c(y; y   1) for all y 2 Y such that 1  y  Ymax:
By this condition, we can construct ~ 2 Rny+ such that
• If Ymax + 1  y  y, then ~yj = 0 for all j 2 N .
• If 1  y  Ymax, then ~yj = 0 for all j 2 Nn(D \ NY
max
), 0  ~yj  u j (y; y   1) for all
j 2 D \ NYmax , and Pj2D\NYmax ~yj = c(y; y   1).
Similarly to the method in the proof of Proposition 1, if we apply Lemma A3 to   j~Nn(D\NYmax ) , we
can show that ~ is a Nash equilibrium of  .12 
11 By this deviation, the level of the project decreases to y() 1 and j’s payoﬀ increases by u j (y(); y() 1)+y ()j >
0.
12 Note that u j (Ymax + 1;Ymax)  c(Ymax + 1;Ymax) for all j 2 N since Ymax = maxD0N Y (D0).
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Proof ofLemma5. LetM  N be such thatY (M) = Ymax. Since fYmaxg = argmaxy2Y Pj2M u j (y) 
c(y), X
j2M
u j (Ymax;Ymax   1) > c(Ymax;Ymax   1): (28)
Excluding agents j 2 M , if any, such that u j (Ymax;Ymax   1)  0, we make M+  f j 2
M j ui (Ymax;Ymax   1) > 0g. Then, by (28), we obtain
c(Ymax;Ymax   1) <
X
j2M
u j (Ymax;Ymax   1) 
X
j2M+
u j (Ymax;Ymax   1):
By the weak concavity of u j for all j 2 N and the weakly convexity of c,X
j2M+
u j (y; y   1) > c(y; y   1) for all y 2 Y such that 1  y  Ymax. (29)
By the weak concavity of u j for all j 2 N , if u j (Ymax;Ymax   1) > 0, then u j (y; y   1) > 0 for all
y 2 Y such that 1  y  Ymax. Hence, M+ is a set that satisfies (10) and (11). 
Proof of Proposition 3. We show that , constructed in (12), is coalition-proof with and without
transfers. Suppose that a coalition D  N deviates from D to 0D 2 R jD jy+ . Let y0  y(0D; NnD ):
y0 is the level of the public project attained by this deviation. Trivially, note that the deviation is never
profitable if y0 = Ymax.
Claim 6 Suppose that y0  Ymax + 1. Then, Pj2D Vj ()  Pj2D Vj (0D; NnD ) and there is i 2 D
such that Vi ()  Vi (0D; NnD ).
Proof of Claim 6. We prove this claim by Lemma A4. We consider the case of  0 =  . Let E  N .
Since Y (E) is the unique maximizer of
P
j2E u j (y)   c(y),X
j2E
u j (Y (E) + 1;Y (E)) < c(Y (E) + 1;Y (E)):
Thus, by the weak concavity of u j and the weak convexity of c, for all y 2 Y such that y  Y (E),X
j2E
u j (y + 1; y) 
X
j2E
u j (Y (E) + 1;Y (E)) < c(Y (E) + 1;Y (E))  c(y + 1; y): (30)
Note that by the definition of Ymax, Y (E)  Ymax. By this condition and (30),X
j2E
u j (y;Ymax) < c(y;Ymax) (31)
for all y 2 Y such that y  Ymax + 1. Thus, in  , (20) holds. By Lemma A4, Pj2D Vj () P
j2D Vj (0D; NnD ), implying that there exists i 2 D such that Vi ()  Vi (0D; NnD ). j j
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First, we show that  is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (without transfers). Suppose, to the
contrary, that  is not coalition-proof. Then, there exist a coalition D  N and 0D 2 R jD jy+ such that
Vi () < Vi (0D; NnD ) for all i 2 D, and 0D is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of   jNnD . By
Claim 6, if y0  Ymax + 1, then it is impossible that the deviation by D is profitable, irrespective of the
self-enforcing property of 0D . Hence, we need to consider the case of y
0  Ymax   1.
Claim 7 Suppose that y0  Ymax   1. In the restricted game  j(NnD; 0DnM ),
(7. i) ((0yi )
y0
y=1; (
y
i )
y
y=y0+1)i2D\M , where (
y
i )
y
y=y0+1 is defined in (12) for all i 2 D \M, is a Nash
equilibrium at which the project is undertaken at the level Ymax,
(7. ii) every Nash equilibrium at which the project is undertaken at the level Ymax is a strong Nash
equilibrium with transfers, and
(7. iii) 0
D\M is strictly Pareto dominated by ((
0y
i )
y0
y=1; (
y
i )
y
y=y0+1)i2D\M .
Proof of Claim 7. For notational simplicity, denote 0
Nn(D\M)  (NnD; 0DnM ) and D\M 
((0yi )
y0
y=1; (
y
i )
y
y=y0+1)i2D\M .
If the level of the public project declines to y0 by this deviation, some agents in M join in this
deviation; otherwise, the level of the project never decreases (note that at , no agent outside M
contributes). Hence, D \M , ;.
Proof of (7.i) We apply Lemma A3 to show that 
D\M is a Nash equilibrium, considering  
0 =
  j0
Nn(D\M); that is,N in Lemma A3 is equal to D\M. Obviously, at D\M , the project undertaken
at Ymax in   j0
Nn(D\M) . By (10), (17) holds at N = 

D\M in   j0Nn(D\M) . (31) implies that (18)
holds at N = D\M in this game. By the fact that 
0
D must be a Nash equilibrium in  jNnD ,
Lemmas A1 and A2, and the construction of  in (12), 
D\M satisfies (14)–(16) in  j0Nn(D\M) .
Hence, by Lemma A3, 
D\M is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of (7.ii) We show by Lemma A5. We consider  0 in which N = D \ M and Vj () =
Vj (; 0Nn(D\M)) for all j 2 D \ M. By (10) of Lemma 5, we obtain u j (y; y   1) > 0 for all
j 2 D \M and all y 2 Y such that 1  y  Ymax. Hence, (22) holds.
We now prove that (20) holds. Let E  D \M. In a way similar to (30),X
j2E
u j (y + 1; y) 
X
j2E
u j (Y (E) + 1;Y (E)) < c(Y (E) + 1;Y (E))  c(y + 1; y):
for all y 2 Y such that y  Y (E). In a way similar to (31),X
j2E
u j (y;Ymax) < c(y;Ymax):
for all y 2 Y such that y  Ymax + 1. Thus, (20) holds. By Lemma A5, every Nash equilibrium
at which the project is undertaken at the level Ymax is a strong Nash equilibrium with transfers in
  j0
Nn(D\M) .
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Proof of (7.iii) For all i 2 D \ M, i’s payoﬀ at 0
D\M is ui (y
0)   Py0y=1 0yi , while his payoﬀ at

D\M is
ui (Ymax)  
y0X
y=1

0y
i  
YmaxX
y=y0+1

y
i = ui (y
0)  
y0X
y=1

0y
i + ui (Y
max; y0)  
YmaxX
y=y0+1

y
i :
By (13), ui (Ymax; y0)  PYmaxy=y0+1 yi > 0 for all i 2 D \M; hence,
ui (y0)  
y0X
y=1

0y
i < ui (Y
max)  
y0X
y=1

0y
i  
YmaxX
y=y0+1

y
i (32)
for all i 2 D \M. j j
By (7.i) and (7.ii) of Claim 7, 
D\M is a strong Nash equilibriumwith transfers of  j(NnD; 0DnM );
hence, it is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of the restricted game. Note that by the definition of
coalition-proof Nash equilibria, no coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is Pareto dominated by other
coalition-proof Nash equilibria (see Remark 1(iii)). Thus, by (7.iii) of this claim, 0
D\M is not
coalition-proof in   j0
Nn(D\M) , which in turn implies that
0
D is not a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
of  jNnD .13 This is a contradiction. Thus, by Claims 6 and 7,  is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
of  .
Second, we can similarly show that  is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium with transfers. We
can prove that if 0D is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium with transfers of  jNnD , then in
  j(NnD; 0DnM ), D\M is a strong Nash equilibrium with transfers at which the project is undertaken
at the level Ymax in a similar way to (7.ii) of Claim 7. Moreover,
X
j2D\M
*.,u j (y0)  
y0X
y=1

0y
j
+/- <
X
j2D\M
*.,u j (Ymax)  
y0X
y=1

0y
j  
YmaxX
y=y0+1

y
j
+/- ;
which is obtained by summing (32) over j 2 D \M. By applying a reasoning in Remark 1(iv), 0D is
not coalition-proof with transfers in  jNnD . Hence,  is also coalition-proof with transfers. 
Proof of Proposition 4. First, note that by Lemma A1, since ^ is a Nash equilibrium, Pj2N ^yj =
c(y; y   1) for all y 2 Y such that 1  y  y(^) and Pj2N ^yj = 0 for all y 2 Y such that
y(^) + 1  y  Ymax. Denote M  ((^yi )y(^)y=1 ; (yi )yy=y(^)+1)i2M , in which ((yi )yy=y(^)+1)i2M is
defined in (12). As in (7.i) of Claim 7, M is shown to be a Nash equilibrium at which the project is
undertaken at Ymax in  j^NnM .
Claim 8 In   j^NnM , (8.i) Vj (M; ^NnM ) > Vj (^) for all j 2 M and (8.ii) M is a strong Nash
13 Note that if 0D is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of   jN nD , then 0E is also coalition-proof of the corresponding
restricted game for all E ( D.
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equilibrium with transfers.
Proof of Claim 8. The proof of (8.i) is similar to that of (7.iii) of Claim 7. Note that u j (Ymax; y(^)) >PYmax
y=y(^)+1 
y
j for all j 2 M (see (13)).
(8.ii) is shown by Lemma A5. We consider  0 such that N = M and Vj () = Vj (; ^NnM ) for
all j 2 M. By (10) of Lemma 5, we have u j (y; y   1) > 0 for all j 2 M and all y 2 Y such that
1  y  Ymax. Hence, (22) holds.
We now prove that (20) holds. Let E  M. Since Y (E) uniquely maximizes Pj2E u j (y)   c(y),X
j2E
u j (Y (E) + 1;Y (E)) < c(Y (E) + 1;Y (E)):
By (1) and (5), for all y 2 Y such that y  Y (E),X
j2E
u j (y + 1; y) 
X
j2E
u j (Y (E) + 1;Y (E)) < c(Y (E) + 1;Y (E))  c(y + 1; y):
By this condition and Y (E)  Ymax, we obtain Pj2E u j (y;Ymax) < c(y;Ymax) for all y 2 Y such
that y  Ymax + 1. Thus, (20) holds.
By LemmaA5, every Nash equilibrium at which the project is undertaken at the levelYmax is a strong
Nash equilibrium with transfers. Since M is a Nash equilibrium at which the project is undertaken at
Ymax, it is also a strong Nash equilibrium with transfers. j j
We can show by Claims 8 that ^ is not coalition-proof with or without transfers in  , similarly to the
last two paragraphs of the proof of Proposition 3. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose that Ymax = y. Then, by Propositions 3 and 4, the level of the project
supported at coalition-proof Nash equilibria with and without transfers is y or higher. However, by
Theorem 2(i), there exists no Nash equilibrium at which the project is undertaken over y. Hence, y
is a unique level of the project supported at coalition-proof Nash equilibria.
Suppose that Ymax > y. By Proposition 3, there exists a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium at which
the project is undertaken over y. By Proposition 4, even if there exist Nash equilibria that support
a level that is less than or equal to y, they are never coalition-proof with or without transfers in  .
Hence, the public project is excessively undertaken at the coalition-proof Nash equilibria. 
Proof of Proposition 5. It is enough to provide an example of the economy. We reconsider the
economy specified in Example 1. Remember that Y = f0; 1; 2g, c(y) = 10y for all y 2 Y, N = f1; 2g,
u1(1) = 4, u1(2) = 1, u2(1) = 12, u2(2) = 23, and y = 1. We show that no  2 Qj2N Sj such that
y() = 1 is a Nash equilibrium. Take a strategy profile  with y() = 1. Note that
P
j2N 2j < 10,
since y() = 1. We obtain that Vi () = ui (1)  P2y=1 tyi (yi ) for each i 2 N .
First, suppose that 2i > 0 for some i 2 N . Then, the payoﬀ to agent i at  is ui (1)   t11 (1i )  2i . If
agent i switches from 2i > 0 to 
20
i = 0 keeping the contribution to the first unit the same, then she can
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still enjoy the public project at one unit by
P
j2N 2j < 10 and she receives the payoﬀ ui (1)   t11 (1i ),
which is greater than the payoﬀ before the switch.
Second, suppose that 2j = 0 for each j 2 N . Then, if agent 2 keeps 12 the same and changes a
contribution to the second unit from 22 to ~
2
2 = c(2; 1), then the second unit is provided and he is
made better oﬀ (note that u2(2; 1) > c(2; 1)).
Finally, suppose that 2j  0 for each j 2 N and 2i < 0 for at least one i 2 N . Suppose that agent
i switches from 2i < 0 to 
20
i = 0 keeping the contribution to the first unit the same. Then, after
the switch, the project level is one unit since 2i + 
2
k
< 2
k
 0 < 10, where k , i. Thus, after the
switch, agent 1 can still enjoy one unit of the project and she receives the payoﬀ ui (1)   t11 (1i ), which
is greater than ui (1)   t11 (1i )   t21 (2i ).
In conclusion, no  2 Qj2N Sj such that y() = 1 is a Nash equilibrium. 
Appendix C: Example of coalition-proofness
Consider a three-player game in Table 1.14 We assume that the payoﬀs in this table are transferable
among members of a coalition if one forms. There are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria: (x2; y2; z1)
and (x1; y1; z2). The former is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, but not one with transfers. The
latter is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium with transfers, but not coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.
Thus, the two sets of coalition-proof Nash equilibria are nonempty and disjoint.
Table 1 Appendix C
y1 y2
x1 4:5; 2; 0 1; 1; 1
x2 1; 1; 1 3; 3; 5
z1
y1 y2
x1 2; 2; 3 1; 1; 3
x2 1; 1; 3 0; 0; 3
z2
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Online Appendix: Core and strong Nash equilibria of the unit-by-unit contribution mech-
anism in economy e1
We consider a cooperative game (N; v), where N is the set of players and v is a characteristic function
such that v(D)  argmaxy2Y Pj2D u j (y)  c(y) for all nonempty D  N . A payoﬀ profile (w j )j2N 2
Rn+ is a core element of this cooperative game if
P
j2N w j = v(N ) and
P
j2D w j  v(D) for all
nonempty D  N .
Claim A1 Suppose that  2 Rny+ is a Nash equilibrium of   in economy e1 such that y() = y. Then,
(i)
P
j2N 
y
j = c(y; y   1) for all y 2 Y such that 1  y  y, (ii) yj = 0 for all j 2 N and all y 2 Y
such that y  y, and (iii) u j (y; y0)  Pyy=y0+1 yj for all y0 2 Y such that y0  y   1.
Proof. Note that u j (y; y   1) > 0 for all j 2 N and all y 2 Y such that y  1. Considering  0 in
which N = N and Vj = Vj for all j 2 N , we obtain the statements in Claim A1 by Lemmas A1 and
A2. 
Proposition A1 Let (w j )j2N 2 Rn+ be a payoﬀ profile such that w j = Vj () for all j 2 N for some
strong Nash equilibrium  2 Rny+ of the unit-by-unit contribution mechanism in economy e2. Then,
(w j )j2N is a core element of (N; v).
Proof. Suppose that (w j )j2N 2 Rn+ is a payoﬀ profile at a strong Nash equilibrium, equivalently a
Nash equilibrium with the provision of y units of the project. Let  2 Rny+ be the Nash equilibrium
supporting (w j )j2N . Since y units of the public project are provided at , then by Claim A1,
X
j2N
y0X
y=1

y
j = c(y
0) for all y0 2 Y such that 1  y0  y;X
j2N

y
j = 0 for all y 2 Y such that y  y + 1;
and u j (y; y0)  
yX
y=y0+1

y
j  0 for all j 2 N and for all y0 2 Y such that y0  y   1:
(33)
By the third condition of (33), we obtain w j = u j (y)  Pyy=1 yj  0 for all j 2 N and
X
j2N
w j =
X
j2N
*.,u j (y)  
yX
y=1

y
j
+/- =
X
j2N
u j (y)   c(y) = v(N ):
Let D ( N . Since agents’ benefit functions are weakly increasing, we obtain Y (D)  y. By the
definition of v, v(D) =
P
j2D u j (Y (D))   c(Y (D)). If Y (D) = y, then Pj2D w j  v(D) holds,
i
trivially. If Y (D) < y, then subtracting v(D) from
P
j2D w j yields
X
j2D
w j   v(D) =
X
j2D

u j (y)   u j (Y (D))

+ c(Y (D))  
X
j2D
yX
y=1

y
j
=
X
j2D
*.,u j
 
y;Y (D)
   yX
y=Y (D)+1

y
j
+/- + c(Y (D))  
X
j2D
Y (D)X
y=1

y
j :
By the third condition of (33), u j (y;Y (D))   Pyy=Y (D)+1 yj  0 for all j 2 D and by the first
condition of (33), c(Y (D))  Pj2D PY (D)y=1 yj  0. Thus, Pj2D w j  v(D). 
ii
